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1- Write a report on a Law and High Technology Crime in about 2500 words with reference to Harvard .
This case (Firm v. Bob)is between a Top Executive Search Firm (Plaintiff) and Bob Sneeky along with two other employees (defendants)of the firm. Those who sued the case can be reached at the office of the Executive Search Firm.
Bob Sneeky (defendant) was employed in a Top Executive Search Firm (plaintiff) for more than ten years. The defendant decided that he would resign from the company and start on his own. Since the defendant had been employed for so long, his credentials were enough to allow him to access the entire system used by the firm. The firm has been very clear that the system would be accessed by the authorized employees only for official purposes and this was conveyed to every employee through the firm’s policy. It was categorically mentioned in the policy that anyone who accessed the client information from the system for personal or unofficial use would be in a clear violation of the terms of the employment agreement.
As per the defendant, he had never read the entire policy during his stay in the firm (which was for more than 10 years). In fact, he had forgotten that such an agreement even existed in the firm. Since he had made up his mind to start on own, he went ahead to access the system of the firm and obtained information on previous and old clients of the firm who were not active clients of the firm. He proceeds to down the list of the plaintiff’s clients and stores them on his removable data storage device / USB drive. He takes the information home.
Bob continues this activity for a couple of weeks and then decides to inform the firm that he would not continue with the services. The firm, however, asks Bob to stick for another couple of weeks and he agrees to the proposal. However, even during the last two weeks with the firm, the defendant continues to extract data from the system by accessing the database. He continues to store information on the USB drive for his personal use.
Post resigning from the firm, Bob starts using the data he had acquired from the firm, before informing about his resignation and after, to contact the people in order to form his own database of prospects.
Some of those clients were quite close to Bob’s boss at the firm and they informed what was going on. Accordingly, an internal investigation was initiated to look into the matter and the firm’s IT department examined the old computer of Bob and the network. From the history records, it was confirmed that the defendant had accessed information from the firm’s system. The firm immediately informs the concerned authority and Bob is arrested.
Upon searching the electronic devices used by Bob, it was revealed that the information he was using belonged to the firm. Apart from that, his email and other messages indicated that the defendant was in touch with two of the current employees at the firm who too accessed information from the firm’s system and passed those on to Bob.
The issues that can be identified in the case Form v. Bob are:
The defendant took advantage of the trust of the firm and consciouslyobtained information from the system since he had access to it. This may not have been a deviation if the use of the information were for the firm’s purpose. However, in this case, the information was intended for his personal use as per 18 U.S.C. 1030 (a)(2). (Fas.org. (2019)
The above was done without informing the firm that he would be accessing information for his own benefit (even if it was inactive data)as per 18 U.S.C. 1030 (a)(4) (Fas.org. (2019).
The data taken from the system was stored on the defendant’s personal storage device by the defendantconsciously. Again, the firm was not informed about the same.
While forwarding his resignation, he never informed the firm that he had taken data from the firm’s system.
After accepting his resignation, the plaintiff requested the defendant to extend his stay for another two weeks since the defendant was important for the firm. During this period too, Bob consciously accessed information intended for personal use.
The above would be considered as both breach of the firm’s policy as well as breach of trust.
Bob continued to obtain information from two active employees of the firm for his personal use. Therefore, both Bob and the two employees helping him are equally at fault since everybody knew what they were doing. Again, a conscious breachby the people involved.
On all the issues, the defendant consciously accessed data and information for the intention and purposes that was categorically restricted by the firm’s policy. The defendant had initially accessed inactive data so that the severity of the breach could be minimized. However, obtaining data from active employees shows that it was a conscious and organized crime. Hence, the defendant (and others) is found guilty on all the issues.
The defendant was matured and experienced enough to know what he was doing. Being a senior employee, statements like he never read the entire policy and not recalling that such a policy existed is baseless and illogical.
The defendant knew at every stage what he was doing could lead to criminal liability. Still, he continued thinking nobody would find out ever.
The ‘Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986’, otherwise known as the CFAA has been around for quite some time. However, there have been few amendments over the years. This law happens to be the most prominent US law that was formulated to prevent cyber crime. The law has been used in many cases all around the country on numerous occasions(Fas.org. (2019).
The prime objective of this law was the prevention of access to computers with the intention of stealing information and it clearly prohibits accessing a computer without proper authorization or in excess of authorization. Violation of the CFAA can be considered a felony, carrying fine or even prison punishment for up to 10 years.
Here, data procured by the two existing employees and passed on to the defendant will not be held against Bob since the defendant has not violated this section as stated in the case of Inc. v. Jones, 305 F. Supp. 2d 564 (D. Md. 2004) (CourtListener 2019).
This case (Citibank v. Ima) is between the Citibank Management Group (Plaintiff) and Ima Bitter (Defendant) who was a former employee of the firm. Those who sued the case can be reached at the Citibank Group office.
The defendant who was working with Citibank and had been terminated a few months back was struggling to find a new job post her termination. Definitely, she was not happy with the Plaintiff and in spite of her efforts, she ran out of options.
With nothing else to do, the defendant decides to access her employee account she had as an employee of Citibank. She found that she was able to log into that account using the previous credentials. The defendant then decides to access information of a few of the old clients she had previously handled and propose them if she could be hired by them as their personal wealth manager. Ima tried to convince the people for a few weeks but nothing happened.
The defendant then decides to bring the whole thing to the notice of her former boss so that she could demonstrate the vulnerability of the system and how easy it was for her to access information from the Citibank system in spite of being an outsider. The purpose behind this was the defendant wanted to give an idea to the plaintiff that she is honest and there was no intention ever to cause any harm (intentionally) to the company. She was wondering if such a move could help to get her job back.
What was unknown to Ima was that when she had accessed her old account at the bank, a virus that was in the defendant’s system was transferred to the system of the plaintiff. This resulted in significant damage to the plaintiff’s system. The losses that the bank had to incur was estimated to be around $1,00,000.00 This calculation was based on the time that the employees were required to spend on the system so that things could be restored back to normal along with the price that the plaintiff had to pay for the services of a special consultant. The calculation also included the overtime that had to be paid to the IT team of the firm and the new cyber-security protocol changes. Re-training of the employees on the new handling procedures was included in the calculation too.
However, the defendant discloses everything to her boss as she had decided, who immediately contacted the authorities and got Ima arrested.
Issues
The issues that can be identified in the case Citibank v. Ima are:
• Unauthorized access by the defendant of the plaintiff’s system post her termination from the company as per 18 U.S.C. 1030 (a)(2)(Fas.org 2019).
• Use of that information by the defendant for her own benefit in a way that it would lead to a loss for the plaintiff as per 18 U.S.C. 1030 (a)(4) (Fas.org 2019).
• Injecting a virus into the plaintiff’s system during the unauthorized access period as per 18 U.S.C. 1030 (a)(5)(a) (Fas.org 2019).
• A monetary loss claim of $1,00,000.00as per 18 U.S.C. 1030 (a)(5)(B)and18 U.S.C. 1030 (a)(5)(C)(Fas.org 2019).
• The calculation details of the same are:
- Time of the employees spent to bring the system back to normal.
- Service charge for appointing a special consultant.
- Overtime paid to the IT team of Citibank.
- Implementation of the new cyber-security protocols.
- Retraining of the employees as per the new handling procedures.
Of all the issues held against the defendant, the only one that would apply is the unauthorized access of the plaintiff’s information as an outsider(18 U.S.C. 1030 (a)(2)). Other than that, there was no intention or action on the part of the defendant to either inflict any damage to the bank either directly or indirectly.
The virus that affected the plaintiff’s system was a drawback in the system of the bank. The virus had no alarming effect on the system of the defendant. This indicates that the plaintiff’s system was highly unsecured.
The monetary loss to the bank and the compensation imposed on the defendant for the time value of the employees for bringing the system back to normal, the charge incurred to the bank for the appointment of a special consultant, the overtime that the plaintiff had to bear for the overtime work of the IT department, implementation of the revised protocols related to cyber security and re-training of the employees as per the updated bank system does not hold since these would have had to be borne by the plaintiff in case there was any breach ever as the bank’s system itself was highly secured.
In fact, it would have cost the plaintiff more if they had to figure out short-coming on their own. The defendant, Ima in a way helped the helped identify the system’s weakness.
The defendant was very careful not to inflict any damage in any way to the plaintiff. She was honest enough to approach her and share all the information whereas the bank had no idea what caused the complication. The virus getting into the plaintiff’s system from the defendant’s end was an accident and not intentional. In fact, the bank should be sued for having such weak security and putting the assets and the trust of its customers at risk.
The defendant right from the very beginning had a clear view and intention. She honestly informed the bank regarding its weakness and there was no intentional damage done (monetary or otherwise) from her end to the plaintiff.
Section 1030 (a)(2) does not impose any monetary penalty on the defendant. The rest also do not hold as per United States v. Nosal (9th Cir. En banc 2012)(Nosal I) (Harvardlawreview.org 2019).
This case (NSA v. Roberto) is between the National Security Agency– NSA (Plaintiff) and Roberto Vigilante (Defendant) who is a graduate student at Cornell University pursuing computer science course. Those who sued the case can be reached at the office of the Department of Defense.
The defendant who is a university student was unnerved by the current allegations against the plaintiff that it was strictly monitoring the private / personal data of the US citizens for reasons best known to the NSA. Hence, the defendant decides to carry out an investigation on his own for a better understanding of the issues. He does some individual research and finds out that it is next to impossible to access the real records or the reports of the plaintiff. Convinced that the people of America do have a right to find out what exactly the government is up to, the defendant proceeds to explore the dark web for a better answer but ends up finding nothing. Roberto then proceeds to come up with a computer program so that he can have access to the data of the NSA and carry out searches with the intention to find information that might be related to the plaintiff’s intention of accessing the information of the American citizens without their knowledge of the same. Apart from this, the defendant also wanted to find out whether there was anything on Russia especially concerning its involvement in the politics of the United States.
The defendant opted not to use the computer of the institute where he had enrolled. Instead, Robert decides to go to SUNY, Binghampton and uses the computer in the library there. Initially, he was unsuccessful in uploading the program into the SUNY system and so he uses a personal laptop he had purchased specifically for accessing the NSA system and launch the spyware program.
On his first attempt, the defendant was able to get into a public facing server that did not have any of the relevant information he was interested in. After trying for about a couple of hours, he decides not to proceed any further and leaves for the day. The defendant gets back to the SUNY library the next week with an improved version of the spyware and once again attempts to access the plaintiff’s servers. Then, he finds out that his IP address has been blocked and is unable to access any of the servers. The defendant then imitates the IP address and finds that he is able to hack into some new servers. Roberto then discovers that are uncountable audio as well as video files along with many other files and information. He then proceeds to run the spyware, however, his attempts are blocked by the security protocols of the NSA servers. The defendant then leaves for the day.
Again after a week, Roberto gets back determined to find the facts he was looking for. The defendant uses a new laptop and is able to access the NSA servers. Right at that point, the defendant is approached by the FBI. The FBI had been tracking Roberto ever since he made his first attempt. The defendant is arrested and all his electronic gadgets along with his laptop are confiscated. All of the gadgets found in his room are searched under a warrant. The FBI finds it difficult to decrypt the devices and so they ask the defendant for the decryption key that Robert refuses to give. The FBI somehow manages to decrypt the devices.
The issues that can be identified in the case NSA v. Roberto are:
• Attempt to access the NSA servers with the intention of looking for information on to what extent was the NSA spying on the personal information of the American citizens along with what information was gathered on Russia having information on the politics of the United States as per 18 U.S.C. 1030 (a)(1) (Fas.org 2019).
• Use of a public computer to hack a government site for the extraction of government information.
• Refusal by the defendant to provide the decryption key to the FBI at the time of the investigation.
The attempt to access the NSA servers was just to look for information and not use it for any other purpose or forward the information elsewhere. In fact, apart from trying to accessing the information, there was no other attempt made by the defendant. Also, the defendant was stopped before he could even go through any specific information. The defendant had just managed to gain access to the NSA system when he was apprehended by the FBI. Therefore, no information could be extracted by the defendant. Also, the FBI has been keeping track of the defendant since his first attempt to access. No apprehension or warning (or whatsoever) was extended to the defendant. This indicates that there was no serious act detected for which an immediate arrest was required.
Use of a public computer for accessing sensitive or restricted information cannot be overlooked. However, the actual access never happened through the public computer. The defendant accessed the database from a new laptop that belonged to him. Therefore, the attempt might have been done using the public property but at the time of the successful attempt, a personal laptop was involved.
Refusal to provide the decryption key by the defendant during the FBI investigation might have amounted to an offense provided Robert wanted to conceal something. However, nothing objectionable was found. Also, the FBI managed to get through and this incident was neither highlighted nor reported.
Throughout the investigation, apart from the attempt to access the NSA database to look for information, no other offense could be linked to the defendant. Robert never had the intention to misuse or corrupt any information or manipulate anything for his personal gain. Therefore, other than the attempt, no other change can be held against him.
The defendantsimply wanted a few answers to his queries. There was no other intention involved other than that.
There was no proof that the defendant has intentions of using national security information that could have either injured the United States or could have been of advantage for any foreign national. Also, there was no incidence that the defendant willfully delivered, communicated or transmitted any classified information.
Comparitech. (2019). What is the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act? | Comparitech. [online] Available at: https://www.comparitech.com/blog/information-security/computer-fraud-and-abuse-act/ [Accessed 17 May 2019].
CourtListener. (2019). Role Models America, Inc. v. Jones, 305 F. Supp. 2d 564 – CourtListener.com. [online] Available at: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2337230/role-models-america-inc-v-jones/ [Accessed 17 May 2019].
Cybersecuritymastersdegree.org. (2019). What Is The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act?. [online] Available at: https://www.cybersecuritymastersdegree.org/what-is-the-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act/ [Accessed 17 May 2019].
Fas.org. (2019). [online] Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20830.pdf [Accessed 17 May 2019].
Harvardlawreview.org. (2019). United States v. Nosal (Nosal II). [online] Available at: https://harvardlawreview.org/2017/02/united-states-v-nosal-nosal-ii/ [Accessed 17 May 2019].